What Is Antisemitism? The IHRA Definition Explained

When a school district, a university, or a court has to decide whether an incident was antisemitic, the first question is deceptively simple: what counts? For much of the world, the working answer is a two-sentence definition adopted in 2016 by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) — a text that now shapes American civil-rights enforcement, legislation in a majority of U.S. states, and the lawsuits this publication covers.

Here is what the definition says, where it came from, who uses it, and why it remains contested.

The IHRA definition, word for word

On May 26, 2016, the IHRA — an intergovernmental body founded in 1998 to promote Holocaust education, research, and remembrance — adopted the following “working definition” at its plenary meeting in Bucharest, Romania:

“Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.”

Two features of that sentence matter legally. First, it covers perception, not just slurs or violence — conspiracy theories and stereotypes qualify. Second, it protects non-Jewish individuals and institutions when they are targeted as Jewish, which is how it reaches attacks on people merely perceived to be Jews or supporters of Jews.

The 11 examples

The definition does not stand alone. IHRA published it with 11 contemporary examples of antisemitism “in public life, the media, schools, the workplace, and in the religious sphere,” each explicitly qualified by the phrase “taking into account the overall context.” They include:

• Calling for, aiding, or justifying the killing or harming of Jews;
• Making mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical allegations about Jews — including the myth of a world Jewish conspiracy;
• Accusing Jews as a people of being responsible for wrongdoing committed by a single Jewish person or group, or even for acts committed by non-Jews;
• Denying the fact, scope, mechanisms, or intentionality of the Holocaust;
• Accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations;
• Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor;
• Applying double standards by requiring of Israel a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation;
• Using the symbols and images associated with classic antisemitism (e.g., claims of Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterize Israel or Israelis;
• Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis;
• Holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the State of Israel.

Seven of the eleven examples relate to Israel — which is precisely why the definition became the center of a political fight. But the text itself draws a line in the other direction too: “criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic.”

Where it came from

The wording predates IHRA. It descends from a 2005 “working definition” drafted by the European Union’s Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), whose lead drafter was the American attorney Kenneth Stern, then the American Jewish Committee’s antisemitism expert. When the EU agency quietly shelved the text in 2013, the U.S. State Department had already incorporated a version into its own guidance, and IHRA — whose 30-plus member governments include the United States, Canada, Israel, and most of Europe — adopted it as a consensus, non-binding document three years later.

Who uses it

A decade on, the adoption numbers explain why the definition keeps surfacing in court filings. According to an annual report by the Combat Antisemitism Movement and Tel Aviv University’s Center for the Study of Contemporary European Jewry, 1,334 entities worldwide had adopted or endorsed the IHRA definition as of December 31, 2025 — including 47 national governments and 37 U.S. states. Of those states, 18 acted through legislation and 19 through executive orders or proclamations. The tally also counts 386 educational institutions, from universities to school districts.

In the United States, the definition’s most consequential foothold is federal civil-rights enforcement. In December 2019, Executive Order 13899 directed agencies enforcing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 — which bars discrimination based on race, color, or national origin in federally funded programs — to “consider” the IHRA definition and its examples when evaluating whether conduct was motivated by antisemitic intent. Title VI does not name religion as a protected category; the executive order was the mechanism that brought anti-Jewish discrimination on campuses within its reach, and it has underpinned investigations and complaints against universities ever since.

The Biden administration’s 2023 National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism reaffirmed that approach, calling IHRA’s the “most prominent” definition while also “welcoming and appreciating” the Nexus Document, a rival text discussed below. State laws keep arriving: legislatures continue to pass bills directing courts and agencies to consult IHRA when weighing discriminatory intent, including in hate-crime sentencing enhancements.

Why it is controversial

Criticism comes from two directions. Free-speech organizations — including the ACLU and the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression — warn that the Israel-related examples can be read to punish political advocacy, particularly on campus. In an unusual twist, Kenneth Stern himself became a leading critic, testifying to Congress in 2017 that a definition drafted to help European data collectors was being “weaponized” to chill pro-Palestinian speech. Supporters counter that the definition is non-binding, expressly protects comparable criticism of Israel, and that the repeated “overall context” qualifier is the safeguard — a point courts weighing anti-SLAPP motions and Title VI complaints have had to engage with directly.

The fight over definitions is not abstract for the institutions we cover. It runs through the debates over the Jewish Council for Public Affairs, the communal advocacy landscape mapped in our profile of Amy Spitalnick, and the litigation over anti-Israel curricular material, including the Liberated Ethnic Studies cases and the campus-antisemitism suits against universities such as MIT.

The alternatives: Nexus and the Jerusalem Declaration

Two rival texts compete for the same ground. The Nexus Document, published in 2019 by a task force at the University of Southern California’s Shoah Foundation and later refined, tries to specify more precisely when speech about Israel crosses into antisemitism — treating, for example, double standards as evidence of antisemitism only when they apply to Jews as a group rather than to Israel per se. The Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism, released in March 2021 and signed by hundreds of scholars, goes further, declaring that boycotts of Israel and calls for a binational state are not, in themselves, antisemitic — a position its drafters intended as a corrective to IHRA and its critics cite as proof the definition needed correcting. IHRA’s defenders respond that both alternatives raise the bar so high that classic manifestations — Nazi comparisons, collective blame — slip through.

Why the definition matters in court

For litigators, the practical point is that the definition increasingly supplies the standard of reference when a judge, agency, or school board must decide whether conduct crossed a line. It appears in Title VI complaints, in state anti-discrimination statutes, in hate-crime enhancements, and in employment disputes. Whether a courtroom applies IHRA, Nexus, or no definition at all can decide a case — which is why adoption fights in statehouses and school boards draw such intense lobbying on both sides, and why California, home to the largest such battles over ethnic studies, keeps producing the test cases.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the IHRA definition of antisemitism?

It is a two-sentence “working definition” adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance in 2016: “Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.” IHRA published it together with 11 illustrative examples.

Is criticism of Israel antisemitic under the IHRA definition?

Not by itself. The definition’s own guidance states that “criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic.” Several of its 11 examples describe Israel-related conduct that can be antisemitic depending on context — such as holding Jews collectively responsible for Israel’s actions or comparing Israeli policy to the Nazis.

How many countries and U.S. states have adopted the IHRA definition?

As of the end of 2025, 47 national governments had adopted or endorsed it, along with 37 U.S. states — 18 by legislation and 19 by executive order or proclamation — according to the Combat Antisemitism Movement and Tel Aviv University. The worldwide total of adopting entities, including cities, universities, and organizations, stood at 1,334.

Is the IHRA definition legally binding?

No. It is a non-binding “working” definition. Its legal force comes from what governments do with it: Executive Order 13899 directs federal agencies to consider it in Title VI enforcement, and state laws variously require courts or agencies to consult it when assessing discriminatory intent or hate-crime enhancements.

Has the IHRA definition changed since 2016?

No. The text adopted in Bucharest on May 26, 2016 remains the operative version. What has changed is the ecosystem around it — rival definitions such as the Nexus Document and the Jerusalem Declaration have emerged, and the White House’s 2023 national antisemitism strategy embraced IHRA while also welcoming Nexus.